Bell and Sacramento by Matthews, Joe
Chapman University
Chapman University Digital Commons
Local Government Reconsidered City of Bell Scandal Revisited
Feb 19th, 12:00 AM
Bell and Sacramento
Joe Matthews
Author and Journalist, joe@zocalopublicsquare.org
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/
localgovernmentreconsidered
Part of the American Politics Commons
This Event is brought to you for free and open access by the Conferences at Chapman University Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Local Government Reconsidered by an authorized administrator of Chapman University Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
laughtin@chapman.edu.
Joe Matthews, "Bell and Sacramento" (February 19, 2015). Local Government Reconsidered. Paper 7.
http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/localgovernmentreconsidered/bellscandal/papers/7
By	Joe	Mathews	
	 You	can	say	a	lot	of	things	about	the	city	of	Bell	officials	caught	in	the	2010	
corruption	scandal.	
You	can	say	the	Bell	officials	enriched	themselves	with	public	do.	You	can	say	
they	paid	themselves	at	some	of	the	highest	levels	of	any	municipal	officials	in	
America.	You	can	say	they	broke	the	law.	You	can	say	they	lied	and	cheated	and	
stole.	You	can	say	they	violated	the	public	trust.	
But	there	is	one	important	thing	that	you	can’t	say	about	them.	You	can’t	say	
they	did	anything	truly	new.		
Heck,	you	can’t	even	say	that	they	weren’t	doing	what	they	were	supposed	to	
do.		
Because	the	officials	in	Bell	did	what	any	California	city	is	supposed	to	do	
under	the	state’s	governance	system:	
Spend	as	much	as	you	can	get	away	with	spending.	
BREAK	
This	is	just	one	paradox	of	Bell.	To	understand	how	the	scandal	in	this	
southeast	L.A.	County	city	fits	with	the	story	of	California	and	its	state	government,	
you	must	reckon	with	this	and	two	other	paradoxes.	
One	is	that	the	Bell	officials	had	the	power	to	get	into	so	much	trouble	in	no	
small	part	because	their	power	was	so	limited.	Another	paradox	is	that	Bell	was	at	
once	both	a	white‐hot	national	scandal,	singular	in	the	attention	it	drew,	and	also	
just	another	small	chapter	in	a	long‐running	California	scandal.	That	scandal	is	a	
half‐century	old	and	it	still	hasn’t	been	resolved	–	because	the	state’s	leaders	keep	
responding	with	the	same	ineffective	strategy.		
If	Californians	understood	these	paradoxes,	which	they	don’t,	Bell	might	not	
have	seemed	like	such	big	news.	Bell’s	corrupt	leaders	lived	and	worked	‐‐	and	
exploited	–	the	same	dark	corners	of	municipal	finance	in	which	every	California	city	
must	operate.	California	cities	operate	in	the	dark	because	that’s	what	the	state	and	
the	voters	require.	
It’s	a	safe	bet	that	this	may	be	the	first	time	you’ve	heard	the	above	
arguments.	And	that	you	may	be	a	little	shocked.	Such	a	reaction	is	understandable,	
because	the	paradoxes	of	Bell	run	counter	to	just	about	everything	people	have	been	
told	about	the	scandal	and	about	today’s	California.	The	dominant	narrative	of	
media	and	politicians	is	that	the	people	in	Bell	had	too	much	power	without	enough	
limits.	And	that	they	took	liberties	that	never	had	been	taken	before.	So	the	answer	
to	this	scandal	must	be	what	it	always	is	after	scandals:	let	Sacramento	adopt	
smarter	new	limits	on	the	power	of	Bell’s	future	leaders	and	their	counterparts	all	
across	California.	Hold	those	local	bastards	accountable.		
Such	conclusions	sound	like	common	sense,	because	they	are	common	sense.	
But	applying	common	sense	to	questions	of	California	local	government	is	a	
fundamental	–	and	dangerous	‐‐	mistake.	California’s	history	in	governance,	
particularly	local	governance,	is	so	uncommon	that	you	must	check	your	common’s	
sense	at	the	door	before	you	can	enter	and	understand.		
	BREAK	
	 If	you	want	to	understand	the	Bell	scandal,	you	can’t	start	with	Robert	Rizzo.	
Before	there	was	Rizzo,	there	was	Russell	Wolden	Jr.		
	 Wolden	was	the	tax	assessor	of	San	Francisco	for	nearly	three	decades,	from	
1940	to	1967,	an	era	when	county	tax	assessors	like	him	mattered.	Wolden	‐‐	like	his	
father	Russell	Wolden	Sr.,	who	had	been	assessor	from	1916	to	1939,	and	the	state’s	
other	county	tax	assessors	–	had	immense	power	because	they	had	real	discretion.		
At	that	time,	amount	that	a	property	owned	paid	in	taxes	turned	on	two	things.	First	
were	the	tax	rates	set	by	your	city,	county	and	school	district.	The	second	thing	was	
Wolden’s	business:	the	value	the	assessor	put	on	property.	Even	if	tax	rates	went	
down,	your	tax	bill	could	still	go	up	if	the	assessor,	at	his	discretion,	said	your	house	
or	factory	had	increased	in	value.		
	 In	1965,	a	whistleblower	revealed	to	the	San	Francisco	Chronicle	that	
Assessor	Wolden	was	corrupt:	he	had	sold	his	judgment	and	discretion.	Documents	
delivered	to	the	newspapers	included	cancelled	checks	and	bribery	fee	schedules.	
Businesses	that	paid	Wolden	got	their	assessment	lowered.		
It	turned	out	that	Wolden	wasn’t	the	only	assessor	who	worked	this	way.	
Jurisdictions	around	California	investigated	and	found	many	more	cases	of	
assessors	handing	out	low‐ball	assessments	to	businesses	that	had	contributed	to	
their	campaigns	or	stuffed	dollars	into	their	pockets.	Wolden,	who	would	forever	be	
known	as	the	Crooked	Assessor,	and	several	other	assessors	went	to	jail.	The	San	
Diego	assessor	committed	suicide.	The	Los	Angeles	County	assessor	was	indicted	
but	found	not	guilty	at	trial.	
	 Scandal	was	not	new	to	California.	Corruption	and	abuse	of	discretion	by	
public	officials	is	a	story	as	old	as	democracy.	But	the	response	to	this	scandal	would	
be	different	‐‐	and	put	California	on	a	course	that	would	lead	directly	to	Bell.	
BREAK	
	
Even	before	news	of	the	crooked	assessor	broke,	the	Assembly’s	tax	
committee	knew	about	assessors’	malpractices	and	put	together	a	plan	to	reduce	the	
state’s	reliance	on	the	property	tax.	But	there	was	pushback.	Counties	and	their	
assessors	wanted	to	keep	this	power.	And	Gov.	Brown	–	Jerry’s	father,	Pat	–	didn’t	
want	to	take	the	political	hit	of	raising	other	taxes	to	make	up	for	reductions	and	
reform	in	the	property	tax.	Instead,	in	1966,	the	legislature	enacted,	and	Brown	
signed	into	law,	a	bill,	AB	80.		
That	legislation	was	the	original	sin,	with	unintended	consequences	still	
being	felt	in	southeast	Los	Angeles	County	and	across	the	state	today.		
The	bill	replaced	the	discretion	of	humans	–	the	assessors	–	with	a	formula.	
All	property	was	to	be	assessed	at	a	rate	of	25	percent	of	market	value.	It	was	a	
clean,	fixed	rule,	a	new	limit	of	the	kind	that	is	sometimes	proposed	after	financial	
scandals.	Fifty	years	later	in	Sacramento,	legislators	and	others	officials,	examining	
the	scandal	in	Bell,	would	respond	with	a	host	of	new	limits,	thus	honoring	this	
tradition.	
But	limits	always	produce	new	incentives	‐‐	and	outcomes	that	are	
unexpected	and	unintended.	AB	80	had	a	huge	unintended	consequence—the	25	
percent	rule	sent	property	taxes	soaring.	It	wasn’t	long	before,	in	San	Francisco,	cars	
started	carrying	bumper	stickers	pleading	“Bring	Back	the	Crooked	Assessor.”			
Why?	Because	it	turned	out	that	California’s	crooked	assessors	had	used	their	
discretion	not	only	selfishly	and	narrowly	‐‐	to	pay	off	their	business	backers	and	
campaign	contributors	‐‐	but	also	broadly	and	politically	‐‐	to	protect	homeowners	
from	big	spikes	in	property	taxes.	Assessments	had	been	held	artificially	low	for	
homeowners.	Assessors	had	to	win	elections,	and	homeowners	voted.	With	a	clear	
25	percent	increase,	there	was	no	longer	room	for	discretion	that	protected	
homeowners.	So	property	taxes	went	up.	
And	so	the	25	percent	rule,	like	so	many	limits,	created	new	pressure	for	new	
limits	on	property	taxes.	It	also,	unintentionally,	created	dark	corners	for	
governments;	local	officials	who	wanted	to	help	homeowners	or	local	businesses	
with	higher	property	taxes	no	longer	had	the	power	to	do	so,	at	least	legally.	So	their	
choices	became:	cheat,	or	turn	to	the	state	level.	So	the	big	question	in	Sacramento	
became:	Couldn’t	something	be	done	to	keep	property	taxes	down?		
Through	the	1970s,	the	state	debated	limitations	on	property	taxes.	But	
legislation	stalled	in	the	state	legislature;	the	new	governor,	another	Brown	(Jerry),	
wanted	to	build	up	a	surplus	to	demonstrate	his	fiscal	responsibility	as	he	sought	the	
presidency,	and	he	was	reluctant	to	offer	significant	property	tax	relief.	On	the	
initiative	side,	there	were	multiple	attempts	to	put	property	tax	reductions	on	the	
ballot,	but	they	failed.		
That	changed	in	1978,	with	the	successful	campaign	of	Paul	Gann	and	
Howard	Jarvis	for	Prop	13.	Prop	13	may	have	felt	like	a	revolution,	but	it	wasn’t	a	
new	idea.	Prop	13	was	another	limit	‐‐	and	a	response	to	the	earlier	limit	AB	80	
limit.	And	its	backers	made	the	same	case	for	it	that	the	backers	of	limits	usually	
make	–	that	it	would	protect	the	people,	from	corruption,	from	surprises,	from	
bigger	bills.		
This	was	a	complicated	new	limit,	because	the	formula	of	Prop	13	had	
multiple	parts.	Property	taxes	couldn’t	exceed	1	percent	of	a	property’s	assessed	
value.	Those	taxes	couldn’t	increase	by	more	than	2	percent	a	year.	Even	more	
important,	Prop	13	brought	two	new	supermajority	formulas	that	would	limit	the	
power	of	local	governments	in	California.	Local	officials	could	no	longer	raise	
property	taxes	by	themselves;	they	would	have	to	ask	local	voters	to	do	it,	and	
secure	a	2/3	vote.	And	appealing	to	Sacramento	for	taxation	would	be	harder,	since	
Prop	13	established	a	2/3‐vote	requirement	for	raising	taxes	in	the	state	legislature.	
The	campaign	drew	big	attention,	but	the	public	debate	mostly	missed	the	
most	important	point.	Prop	13	was	sold	as	imposing	new	limits	on	politicians,	thus	
putting	them	in	their	place.	In	fact,	all	the	limits	empowered	Sacramento	and	its	
state	politicians,	centralizing	control	there	and	posing	new	obstacles	to	local	
governance.		“What	would	happen	to	local	control	of	local	government	under	
Proposition	13?”	the	California	Taxpayers’	Association	asked	during	the	campaign,	in	
one	plea	that	was	ignored.	“Is	there	any	way	to	prevent	greater	state	control?”		
	
Prop	13	passed	overwhelmingly.	And,	overnight,	the	fiscal	picture	for	local	
governments	turned	upside	down.	With	a	single	vote,	the	locals	lost	revenue	amount	
to	22	percent	of	their	budgeted	expenditures.	And	Prop	13	was	just	the	beginning.	It	
served	as	a	base	of	a	new	operating	system	of	California	government,	spawning	new	
limits	and	formulas	on	taxes	and	spending.	The	first	principle	of	this	new	operating	
system	was	that	the	discretion	of	local	officials	should	be	limited,	particularly	when	
it	came	to	raising	revenues.	
This	new	era	of	limits	–	an	era	we’re	still	living	in	today	‐‐	left	local	officials	
with	fewer	options.	They	could	do	two	things:	they	could	go	to	Sacramento	to	
demand	funds	from	state	government.	Or	they	could	try	to	find	ways	around	the	
limits	by	themselves.	They	could	work	in	dark	corners,	where	the	limits	didn’t	reach,	
where	they	might	raise	revenues	and	try	to	remain,	at	least	in	part,	the	authors	of	
their	communities’	own	futures.		
In	time,	every	city	in	California	would	look	for	money	in	both	places	–	
Sacramento	and	in	dark	corners	–	but	Sacramento	came	first.	
Sacramento’s	post‐Prop	13	bailout	of	local	governments	was	probably	
inevitable.	The	threat	of	pain	to	cities	and	school	districts	was	just	too	powerful.	Too	
many	interest	groups	were	demanding	a	bailout.	And	Gov.	Brown’s	obscenely	large	
surplus	was	too	tempting	a	source	of	funds	in	such	times.		
And	so	the	bailout	began.	First	came	a	temporary	bill,	which	included	not	just	
money	but	more	limits	on	local	government.	Cities	and	counties	couldn’t	fire	police	
or	fire	personnel,	the	legislation	said,	and	the	locals	were	instructed	to	use	their	
reserves	in	ways	that	softened	program	cuts.	A	year	after	Prop	13’s	passage,	a	bigger,	
permanent	bailout	bill	gave	the	state	even	more	power	over	locals.	“I	don’t	think	
local	government	has	ever	been	restored	to	independence,”	the	State	Senator	Peter	
Behr	would	later	recall.	
Prop	13	and	the	post‐Prop	13	bailout	marked	the	beginning	of	a	great	
centralization	of	power	in	California.	Sacramento	took	charge	of	funding	schools	and	
various	local	programs.	The	state	budget	grew	in	size	and	importance,	as	local	
functions	became	state	ones.	Today,	nearly	three‐quarters	of	the	state	budget	would	
consist	of	local	aid.	The	locals	would	spend	the	money;	Sacramento	would	raise	it	
and	distribute	it.		
As	the	state	became	the	provider	of	revenues,	the	essence	of	city	governance	
changed.	According	to	hoary	American	proverb,	all	politics	is	local.	That’s	because,	in	
most	of	America,	local	governments	set	tax	rates	to	raise	revenue	for	the	programs	
they	fund.	And	when	a	government	raises	revenues,	it	creates	politics,	as	people	
fight	about	where	those	revenues	will	come	from.	
California	went	in	a	decidedly	different	direction.	After	Prop	13,	all	politics	
was	no	longer	local;	politics	was	slowly	transferred	to	Sacramento,	since	that’s	
where	the	revenue	was	raised.	California	city	officials	were	no	longer	supposed	to	be	
revenue	raisers.	And	so	their	incentives	changed.	Instead	of	balancing	the	needs	for	
spending	against	the	pain	of	raising	revenues,	they	no	longer	had	to	consider	
revenues.	Their	job	was	to	spend.	And	spend.	And	spend	some	more.	
And	since	revenues	came	from	Sacramento,	it	didn’t	make	much	sense	to	
spend	less,	even	when	revenues	were	less.	It	was	better	to	spend	more	–	and	lobby	
and	blame	Sacramento	when	its	funds	were	insufficient.		
The	gambit	worked	–	in	part	because	Prop	13	had	forced	high‐profile	cuts	to	
so	many	local	services.	Things	that	Californians	born	after	1970	now	simply	take	for	
granted––that	you	have	to	pay	to	get	a	police	report	or	a	permit	to	carry	a	weapon;	
pay	when	the	paramedics	whisk	you	to	the	hospital	after	you	fall	off	your	motorcycle	
and	break	your	leg;	pay	to	swim	at	the	public	pool;	hold	a	meeting	at	a	community	
center;	play	on	the	softball	diamond,	or	take	an	exercise	class;	pay	at	school	for	a	
field	trip—all	started	with	Prop	13.	This	loss	of	public	goods	mattered	less	to	the	
rich,	who	could	raise	private	money	to	preserve	the	services	they	most	valued.	These	
cuts	mattered	much	more	to	people	with	lower	incomes,	most	of	whom	got	no	tax	
cut.	Their	California	communities		‐‐	cities	like	Bell	‐‐		became	shabbier	places,	
where	people	could	rely	less	on	their	government.	And	so	people	were	less	
connected	to	local	government.	
This	bitter	reality	fed	on	itself.	Californians	came	to	believe	the	narrative	that	
cities	are	constantly	being	shortchanged	by	Sacramento,	which	was	spending	all	the	
money	on	itself.	Virtually	every	campaign	season	saw	both	parties	run	against	
Sacramento,	which	had	all	this	new	power.		Anti‐Sacramento	rhetoric	became	a	
staple	of	civic	life,	and	an	assumption	among	media.		
	 Few	noticed	that	the	opposite	was	true.	That	local	governments	were	
spending	more	and	more	on	themselves,	and	that	they	were	doing	so	in	ways	that	
were	hidden	and	dark.	They	did	more	and	more	borrowing,	pushing	today’s	costs	off	
into	the	future.	They	hid	huge	pay	boosts	to	local	police	and	fire	and	officials	in	
pension	and	health	benefits	that	weren’t	properly	accounted	for	and	wouldn’t	have	
to	be	paid	for	until	far	off	in	the	future.	Confusion	about	this	fact	–	that	the	locals	
were	the	big,	irresponsible	spenders	‐‐	ran	across	the	political	spectrum,	from	the	
most	cynical	fixers	to	the	most	idealistic	reformers.	Those	who	denounced	the	rapid	
growth	of	lobbying	Sacramento	in	the	‘80s	and	‘90s	railed	against	corporate	and	
union	lobbies,	while	mostly	ignoring	the	fact	that	the	biggest	groups	lobbying	in	
Sacramento	were	local	governments,	hiring	influencers	to	get	more	money.	And	
Californians	to	this	day	have	never	understood	the	fact	that,	as	the	locals	gobbled	up	
money,	the	state	government’s	spending	on	itself	was	lean	and	getting	leaner.			
In	this	new	post	Prop	13	operation	system,	the	state	money	was	always	
insufficient	as	locals	spent	more.	And	so,	while	they	would	never	stop	whining	about	
Sacramento,	local	governments	also	looked	for	ways	to	raise	money.	And	that	drove	
them	into	dark	corners	for	more	revenues.	It	wasn’t	just	the	borrowing,	often	exotic	
and	risky,	to	pay	for	spending.	There	were	all	kinds	of	new	fees,	not	covered	by	the	
tax	limits.	Cities	also	set	up	new	special	funds	and	accounts	that	weren’t	governed	
by	state	limits.	Cities	approved	rampant	retail	development	as	a	way	of	gaming	the	
sales	tax	to	produce	more	local	revenue.		
A	favorite	tactic	of	local	governments,	including	the	one	in	Bell,	involved	
redevelopment	agencies.	By	declaring	part	or	all	of	their	cities	to	be	blighted,	they	
could	establish	redevelopment	agencies	that	gobbled	up	increases	in	property	taxes,	
holding	onto	money	that	would	have	gone	to	the	state,	and	to	schools.	The	money	
only	rarely	went	to	anything	that	could	be	called	redevelopment.	It	funded	other	
operations,	even	salaries.	After	Jerry	Brown	went	back	into	politics	as	mayor	of	
Oakland	in	the	late	1990s,	some	of	his	salary	was	covered	by	redevelopment.	This	
use	of	dark	corners	to	find	money,	to	spend,	and	to	govern	became	more	and	more	
common.	Dark	corners	were	where	municipal	business	got	done.	
The	opacity	and	complexity	of	California	municipal	finance	had	many	
negative	consequences.	It	required	cities	to	pay	more	to	find	people	who	could	
manage	these	increasingly	complicated	finances	–	and	it	required	more	of	these	
employees.	Expensive	lawyers	and	consultants	became	necessary	to	navigate	
through	all	the	darkness.		
But	the	worst	thing	was	how	this	new	status	quo	disempowered	citizens,	and	
thus	eliminated	the	most	basic	check	on	local	governments	(or	anyone):	the	eyes	
and	ears	of	neighbors.	
It	was	not	merely	that	local	governance	became	too	complex	for	citizens	to	
understand.	And	it	wasn’t	just	that	too	much	business	was	done	outside	the	council,	
in	extra	committees	and	in	those	dark	corners.	It	was	that,	by	making	it	harder	for	
local	communities	to	raise	taxes,	the	new	California	system	limited	the	incentive	for	
the	public	to	participate.	
Before	Prop	13,	local	agencies	and	their	boards	had	dual	duties.	They	decided	
how	much	to	spend	on	public	services,	and	they	set	the	property	tax	rate	needed	to	
supply	that	money.	And	because	they	had	the	power	to	tax,	they	attracted	a	lot	of	
attention,	not	just	from	people	interested	in	the	quality	of	the	services,	but	also	from	
property	owners,	both	business	and	homeowners,	who	paid	the	taxes	to	support	
those	services.	In	the	two	decades	before	Prop	13,	tens	of	thousands	of	them	showed	
up	at	public	meetings	to	protest	their	tax	bills.	
But	Prop	13	and	successor	measures	(Proposition	62	in	1986	and	
Proposition	218	in	1996)	took	away	taxing	authority	from	local	elected	officials.	
(School	boards	had	begun	to	lose	their	taxing	authority	with	the	Serrano	
equalization	decision	in	1971.)	Without	the	power	to	tax,	local	governments	were	
less	of	an	immediate	threat	to	local	pocketbooks.	It	was	no	longer	necessary	for	
business	and	taxpayer	groups	to	watch	them	so	carefully.	
And	so	leaders	of	business	groups	began	a	retreat	from	local	public	service.	
“Beginning	in	the	early	to	mid‐seventies	and	culminating	with	Proposition	13,”	
recalled	Gary	Hart,	who	served	in	both	the	Assembly	and	State	Senate,	“leaders	in	
the	community,	people	in	the	Rotary	[clubs],	said,	‘This	is	not	a	good	use	of	my	time,	
this	is	no	fun.	All	we’re	doing	is	cutting.’	Who	needs	that?”		
Business	leaders	accommodated	themselves	to	this	state	of	affairs,	which	had	
its	advantages:	they	no	long	had	to	worry	so	much	about	what	local	leaders	might	be	
up	to.	They	could	go	to	Sacramento,	with	all	that	centralized	power,	and	block	
unfriendly	local	actions	with	one	law	at	the	state	level.	This	played	out	most	clearly	
in	the	case	of	infrastructure.	After	Prop	13,	local	governments	could	no	longer	sell	
general	obligation	bonds,	repaid	through	the	property	tax,	to	build	roads	and	
firehouses	and	other	infrastructure.	So	they	turned	to	devices	like	impact	fees	on	
developers	to	pay	for	those	things.	That	brought	the	developers	and	builders	to	
Sacramento	with	demands	for	infrastructure	solutions	that	didn’t	cost	them	
anything.	And	they	successfully	limited	many	of	these	fees.	In	effect,	the	battle	over	
local	issues	–	development	and	roads	and	schools	–	shifted	to	Sacramento	–	in	1978.	
It	has	remained	there	since.		
The	retreat	of	what	might	be	called	the	“taxpayer	interest”	left	the	field	in	
local	politics	to	those	whose	primary	interest	in	local	government	is	as	a	source	of	
income	or	subsidy—developers,	government	contractors	and,	most	especially,	
public	employees.	They	provided	the	biggest	contributions	to	local	candidates	and	
delivered	the	most	bodies	to	staff	phone	banks	and	walk	precincts.	Often	the	
candidates	and	elected	officials	were	public	employees	who	lived	in	the	city	but	
worked	in	other	jurisdictions.		
Operating	with	little	scrutiny	from	their	own	residents	or	from	the	shrinking	
mainstream	news	media,	local	governments	dominated	by	their	employees	made	
pay	and	pension	commitments	that	they	could	not	keep.	In	California,	the	salary	and	
pension	boosts	that	made	Bell	infamous	would	stand	out	in	degree	–	but	not	by	their	
existence.	The	central	irony	of	the	Prop	13	system	was	how	this	measure,	which	
holds	a	holy	place	in	the	conservative	pantheon,	made	it	easier	government	
employees	to	grab	as	much	influence	and	money	as	they	could.	
And	grab	they	did.	Although	they	had	been	among	Prop	13’s	fiercest	
opponents,	public	employee	unions	found	the	centralization	a	convenient	way	to	
win	at	the	capitol	what	was	formerly	hard	to	win	at	the	bargaining	table,	local	
employer	by	local	employer,	negotiation	by	negotiation.	For	example,	in	1982	
California	became	the	first	state	to	enact	a	law	requiring	local	governments	to	treat	
any	cancer	in	firefighters	as	a	disability	caused	by	their	jobs.	Since	then,	unions	have	
succeeded	in	extending	presumptive	disability	to	other	public	safety	workers	and	
other	diseases.	(Bell’s	police	chief	during	the	2010	scandal	would	try	to	use	these	
laws	to	his	personal	advantage.)	
Together,	all	these	trends	defined	the	California	disease.	Even	as	government	
budgets	for	broad	public	programs	came	up	short,	even	as	everyone	from	poor	
single	mothers	to	college	students	got	less	and	paid	more,	public	employees	
continue	to	snatch	scarce	tax	dollars	for	their	own	benefits.	In	city	after	city,	salaries	
and	benefits,	especially	for	law	enforcement,	gobble	up	most	of	the	money,	hurting	
the	ability	to	deliver	services	to	local	residents.	
Sometimes	a	bankruptcy	or	a	newspaper	would	expose	one	or	another	
particularly	awful	abuse	of	this	local	power	–	pension	spiking,	personal	use	of	public	
funds,	runaway	salaries.	But	California	simply	had	too	many	governments	for	the	
public	to	pay	attention	to	more	than	a	few	at	a	time.	This	was	a	state	of	58	counties,	
nearly	500	cities,	more	than	1,000	school	districts	and	more	than	4,500	special	
districts.	With	so	many	offices	to	fill	and	too	many	politicians	to	keep	track	of,	voters	
couldn’t	use	the	ballot	to	impose	accountability.		“I	currently	have	twenty‐two	
people	I	elect	to	represent	me	at	all	levels	of	government,	and	I	can’t	name	them––
and	I’m	president	of	the	California	Voter	Foundation,”	Kim	Alexander,	the	leader	of	
the	civic	education	group	said	in	2009.	
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This	broken	structure	required	top	to	bottom	reform.	But	these	harsh	
realities	never	produced	change	because	they	were	so	profoundly	misunderstood.	
Media,	civic	leaders	and	politicians	themselves	have	consistently	defined	California’s	
problems	as	the	failure	of	leaders	‐‐	not	of	a	broken	governance	structure	that	pits	
the	locals	and	Sacramento	against	each	other.	So,	instead	of	a	new	constitution,	the	
solution	to	each	new	problem,	to	each	new	scandal	in	each	new	place,	became	
standard:	impose	new	limits	to	restrain	wayward	locals.		
And	when	those	limits	proved	ineffective,	as	they	always	did,	there	would	be	
another	round	of	limits.	
The	necessary	changes	were	considered	unrealistic	–	even	though	they	were	
clearer,	and	less	complicated,	than	the	status	quo.	Fixing	California	local	and	state	
government	would	require	a	return	to	fundamentals.	Each	major	program	should	be	
assigned	to	the	proper	level	of	that	government.	A	local	program	should	be	paid	for	
with	money	revenue	that	was	raised	at	the	local	level.	There	should	be	fiscal	
rewards	for	success	in	running	a	program,	and	penalties	for	failure.	
California’s	local	government	system	also	required	consolidation.	With	too	
many	governments	to	monitor,	cities	and	counties	and	special	districts	should	be	
forced	to	combine.	Many	governments	should	be	eliminated,	in	the	name	of	good	
governance	and	accountability.	One	of	the	best	recommendations	of	the	last	
Constitution	Revision	Commission,	in	1996,	was	to	give	citizens	in	California’s	
different	regions	both	the	permission	and	the	tools	to	remake	their	local	agencies	
and	take	more	control	over	their	destiny.	Under	the	commission’s	proposal,	counties	
and	groups	would	be	empowered	to	set	up	citizen	commissions	to	rethink	their	
local	governments––shuffle	and	combine	their	missions,	merge	or	eliminate	them,	
redraw	their	boundaries.	Out	of	these	deliberations	would	come	a	new	charter	for	
voter	approval.	
The	recommendation,	like	so	many	good	ideas	in	Sacramento,	was	ignored,	
and	forgotten.	The	new	system	of	limits	prevailed,	and	grew.	
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So	instead	of	a	charter	process	that	might	have	combined	the	small	city	of	Bell	with	
some	of	its	neighbors	among	Los	Angeles	County’s	88	cities	in	the	name	of	efficiency	
and	better	service,	Bell’s	leaders	proposed	a	new	charter	in	the	year	2005.	The	city	
charger	prevailed	in	an	election	in	which	less	than	400	people	voted.	This	drew	little	
notice	at	the	time.	Wasn’t	this	how	California,	with	its	centralized	power	in	
Sacramento	and	its	weak	local	governments	worked?	
The	new	charter	set	the	stage	for	the	scandal.	The	charter	gave	new	power	to	
local	officials,	yes.	But	the	charter,	and	much	of	what	would	happen	in	Bell,	was	
really	about	lack	of	power.	The	core	of	the	new	charter	was	rules	that	allowed	the	
city	to	get	around	the	state’s	many	limits.	The	new	charter	pointedly	exempted	the	
city	from	state	contracting	procedures	and	a	state	law	limiting	council	members’	
salaries.	
In	seeking	ways	around	the	ubiquitous	limits	imposed	form	Sacramento,	Bell	
was	different	than	other	California	cities	only	in	degree.		To	run	a	municipality	in	
this	state	required	operating	in	dark	corners,	and	trying	to	find	money	anywhere.	
Why	should	Bell	be	any	different?		
As	one	reads	today	through	the	reports	and	indictments	and	court	transcripts	
of	how	Bell	officials	operated,	it’s	striking	how	their	actions,	while	extreme,	touched	
on	all	the	possible	dark	corners.	
Bell	officials	boosted	salaries,	and	the	pensions	and	benefits	of	top	officials	as	
well	as	police	and	fire.	They	did	an	off‐the‐books	property	purchase	from	a	former	
mayor.	They	hired	contractors	and	consultants	in	questionable	ways.	The	city’s	
employees	advanced	personal	loans	to	themselves.	And	they	squirreled	away	
millions	in	illegal	retirement	accounts.	
They	raided	different	accounts	within	the	city,	from	gas	taxes	to	housing	
funds.	They	pushed	through	fees	on	businesses	and	sanitation	and	sewage	system.	
One	of	their	most	serious	departures	from	the	law	was	how	they	imposed	new	taxes	
and	fees	without	the	voter	approval	for	new	taxes	and	fees.	They	managed	to	get	
away	with	this	in	part	because	they	couldn’t	legally	do	it	–	so	taxpayers	weren’t	
watching	in	Bell,	just	like	they	weren’t	watching	in	other	cities.	Among	their	illegal	
(and	ironic)	maneuvers	was	a	violation	of	Prop	13	itself	–	an	illegal	boost	in	the	
property	taxes	above	the	initiative’s	limits	in	order	to	fund	retirement;	the	
overcharge	ran	to	$3	million.	
Bell	officials,	like	their	counterparts	around	the	state,	used	the	city’s	
redevelopment	agency	like	a	piggybank.	They	grabbed	state	funds	from	places	that	
weren’t	good	at	watching	their	money,	like	the	state	parks	department.	And	like	so	
many	cities,	they	borrowed.	One	of	the	great	ironies	of	today’s	California	is	how	
Sacramento’s	attempts	to	limit	debt	on	the	state	level	–	most	recently	via	the	passage	
of	the	debt	reduction	formula	Prop	2	on	the	November	2014	ballot	–	have	
incentivized	cities	to	borrow	even	more	themselves.	Bell	did	this	irresponsibly,	
issuing	$50	million	in	general	obligation	bonds	without	any	plan	or	time	frame	to	
utilize	the	proceeds.	But	this	was	hardly	an	innovation.	A	California	city	takes	money	
where	it	can	get	it.	
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	 In	Sacramento,	the	reaction	to	the	Bell	scandal,	exposed	by	the	LA	Times	in	
the	summer	of	2010,	showed	that	no	one	had	learned	much	of	anything	from	the	
past	50	years	of	municipal	scandals	in	California.	Russell	Wolden’s	name	had	been	
forgotten.	Sacramento’s	leaders	did	not	propose	or	discuss	systemic	change	in	
municipal	governance	and	finance.	Instead,	various	parts	of	the	state	government	
touted	investigations	–	the	controller,	the	attorney	general,	the	legislature	–	of	what	
had	happened	in	Bell,	and	tried	to	outdo	themselves	in	expressions	of	outrage.	
“These	outrageous	salaries	in	Bell	are	shocking	and	beyond	belief,"	said	then‐
Attorney	General	Jerry	Brown,	who	was	a	few	months	from	being	returned	to	the	
governor’s	office.	"With	record	deficits	and	painful	budget	cuts	facing	California	
cities,	astronomical	local	government	salaries	raise	serious	questions	and	demand	a	
thorough	investigation.”		
The	Bell	salaries	were	outrageous,	but	were	they	really	surprising?	Bell	officials	had	
done	what	cities	always	do	–	only	more	brazenly	and	greedily.	
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The	second	phase	of	Sacramento’s	reaction	was	a	repeat	of	the	response	to	
earlier	scandals,	going	back	to	the	Crooked	Assessor:	the	proposal	of	new	
restrictions	on	Bell	and	other	cities.	But	the	bills	came	down	so	quick	and	numerous	
as	the	Bell	news	that	the	legislature	failed	to	pass	most	of	them.	Lawmakers	said	
there	was	simply	too	little	time	to	vet	them	and	refine	them	before	the	end	of	the	
summer,	when	the	legislature	went	home	to	spend	the	fall	campaigning.	
In	2011,	the	bills	came	more	quickly.	But	they	showed	little	imagination.	
Most	fell	into	one	of	two	categories:	increasing	penalties	for	doing	what	people	in	
Bell	had	did,	or	making	it	clear	that	things	the	Bell	people	had	done	were	illegal.	So	
one	bill	proposed	to	take	pension	benefits	from	city	manager	convicted	of	misusing	
taxpayer	funds.	Another	sought	to	prevent	city	council	members	from	being	paid	for	
serving	on	multiple	city	commissions.	There	were	new	training	mandates	and	ethics	
mandates	and	salary	disclosure	mandates	and	pension	disclosure	mandates	and	car	
allowance	disclosure	mandates	and	bonus	disclosure	mandates.	Several	measures	
sought	to	stop	pension	spiking.	A	couple	of	measures	targeted	the	Bell	police	chief	
and	his	pension	benefits	from	cities	where	he	had	previously	served.	Another	
imposed	new	requirements	for	publicity	when	city	officials	hold	simultaneous	or	
back‐to‐back	meetings.		
John	Chiang,	the	state	controller,	did	the	best	in	this	campaign	by	Sacramento	
politicians	to	show	toughness	on	Bell.	He	not	only	demanded	more	disclosure	from	
cities.	He	got	salary	and	benefit	data	from	local	governments	around	the	state	and	
put	it	online,	where	it	remains,	searchable,	today.	
	 But	what	was	more	interesting	is	what	didn’t	happen.	There	was	very	little	
assessment	of	the	finances	of	California	cities.	For	all	the	focus	on	official	salaries,	
and	the	sneaky	ways	officials	had	found	revenue,	there	was	precious	little	scrutiny	
of	how	California	cities	managed	and	spent	their	money.	And	no	one	asked	the	most	
basic	questions	about	municipal	finance	in	the	state:	Does	the	state’s	system	of	
encouraging	local	officials	to	spend,	but	limiting	their	power	over	revenues,	
encourage	irresponsible,	even	criminal	behavior,	by	pushing	cities	to	do	their	
business	in	the	dark?	
	 There	was	another	basic	failure.	For	all	the	gnashing	of	teeth	in	Sacramento	
about	Bell’s	failures	and	all	the	proposals	for	new	limits,	no	one	in	the	state	capital	
managed	to	get	Bell	what	it	needed	in	2010:	emergency,	effective	administration	to	
get	its	finances	in	order.	Yes,	the	legislature	did	intervene	to	make	it	possible	to	
swear	in	a	new	city	council	(after	the	removal	of	previous	council	members	meant	
there	was	no	one	who	could	handle	the	duty).	But	beyond	that,	Sacramento	was	
unable	to	put	in	place	leadership	that	could	dig	Bell	out.	And	so	Bell	remained	a	
managerial	mess	for	nearly	two	years	after	the	scandal	broke.	There	were	four	
different	city	management	teams,	all	interims	during	those	two	years.	And	the	city	
faced	so	many	overlapping	investigations	from	different	levels	of	government,	plus	
the	news	media,	that	progress	in	addressing	the	city’s	problems	was	nearly	
impossible.	Everyone	piled	on.	
It	wasn’t	until	late	in	the	spring	of	2012	that	a	new	permanent	city	manager	could	
be	found.	The	city	remains	focused	on	digging	out	of	the	hole;	the	work	required	to	
prevent	a	recurrence	is	ongoing.	In	2013,	the	state	controller’s	office	noted	that	of	
its	34	recommendations	for	how	Bell	should	put	itself	back	together	and	right	the	
wrongs	of	its	previous	leaders,	only	one	had	been	fully	implemented.	
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	 There	is	one	final	paradox	of	Bell.	Fixing	local	government	in	California	–	and	
preventing	local	officials	from	behaving	like	those	in	Bell	–	would	require	giving	
more	discretion	and	freedom	to	local	officials.		
That	seems	to	violate	common	sense	–	which	is	a	good	sign	that	the	logic	is	
California‐solid.	Instead	of	using	limits	and	restrictions	to	force	city	officials	into	
dark	corners,	limits	should	be	lifted	and	officials	given	more	power	and	discretion,	
so	they	can	operate	more	easily	in	the	daylight.		
The	best,	most	direct	reform	would	be	to	give	California's	local	governments	
more	power	to	raise	taxes	and	other	revenues	themselves.	When	cities	can	tax,	the	
citizens	and	business	people	who	might	see	their	taxes	raised	have	a	strong	
incentive	to	watch	what's	happening	in	City	Hall.	And	when	taxpayers	are	watching,	
it's	much	more	difficult	to	give	your	city	manager	an	$800,000	salary.	
	 This	is	not	a	new	idea.	The	state’s	legislative	analyst	office,	in	a	1993	report	
on	California’s	convoluted	local	governance	structure	that	is	still	quoted	today,	
wrote	that	“The	ability	of	local	agencies	to	determine	the	appropriate	mix	and	level	
of	expenditures	to	reflect	their	community’s	preferences	is	dependent	upon	the	
community’s	ability	to	raise—or	lower—the	level	of	local	taxes	they	pay.”	The	LAO	
suggested	letting	local	voters,	by	majority	vote,	change	the	Prop	13‐mandated	1	
percent	property	tax	rate.	In	1996,	that	same	constitutional	revision	commission	
also	called	for	letting	voters	in	their	new	charter	governments	raise	taxes,	other	
than	property	taxes,	by	majority	vote.		
	 In	the	name	of	accountability,	it	would	be	even	better	to	let	local	officials	set	
the	tax	rates	for	the	programs	they	must	fund,	to	put	taxing	and	spending	in	the	
same	hands.	That	is	the	shortest	path	to	accountability.	But	this	is	California,	where	
the	usual	response	to	such	proposals	is	to	yell,	“Protect	Prop	13!”	The	point	of	
yelling	“Protect	Prop	13”	is	not	to	inform	people,	but	to	end	any	conversation.	This	
conversation	has	been	ended	successfully	for	more	than	35	years.	
If	local	control	means	anything,	it	means	letting	local	elected	leaders	and	
voters	make	their	own––and	probably	very	different––choices	about	how	much	
revenue	to	raise	to	meet	their	local	needs.	But	Sacramento	doesn’t	want	to	do	that.	
For	50	years,	Sacramento	has	been	responding	to	local	scandals	by	tightening	the	
reins.	After	Bell,	those	reins	are	being	tightened	again.		
This	will	only	push	more	municipalities	into	darker	corners,	into	
workarounds	around	the	new	limits.	The	response	to	Bell	makes	this	the	safest	bet	
in	California:	there	will	be	more	Bells.	
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